| | | | The US and Taliban have agreed on the framework of a deal, The New York Times reports, the basics of which include Taliban assurances that Afghanistan won't become a haven for terrorism, in exchange for US troop withdrawal.
The news raises many questions: Could the Taliban agree to a ceasefire, and would it hold? Could it really deny a safe haven to al Qaeda and ISIS branches? Could it reach an agreement with Afghanistan's central government?
Pakistan has long played an important role in America's war, and author Ahmed Rashid writes in the Times of positive movement on that front: In October, Pakistan released a long-revered and relatively moderate Taliban figure, who is expected to participate in talks, and it appears to support the US mission to reach an accord. | | Despite Venezuela's deepening economic crisis, opposition leader Juan Guaido's challenge to President Nicolas Maduro came as a surprise and amounts to a gamble that might not work, given Maduro's outside support, Harold Trinkunas writes in Foreign Affairs. It's a gamble the US has taken along with Guaido, as Vice President Mike Pence offered Guaido America's support ahead of time—and as the US moved today to impose sanctions.
No solution appears obvious, but CNN's Jeffrey Sachs proposes one: a temporary power sharing arrangement until new elections can be held in a few years. If the US is bent on regime change, Sachs writes, that might not be possible. | | Will the Euroskeptics Run (or Ruin) Europe? | | | European Parliament elections are looming in May, and populist parties, both left and right, figure to send more representatives to Brussels "than ever before," Mujtaba Rahman, head of Eurasia Group's Europe practice, writes in Politico EU. With the traditional powers—UK, France, and Germany—all diminished, it could gum up the works in Brussels, leave the European Parliament more fragmented, and put the EU on shakier ground.
While unlikely, it's "not impossible" that far-right groups coalesce to form the parliament's second-largest faction, Rahman writes, and reporting from Politico EU last week indicated Euroskeptics are trying harder to cooperate across borders—a traditional oxymoron for nationalists. | | President Trump may have floated the idea of leaving NATO, but the Western alliance appears to be holding. After bucking the Trump administration on Yemen policy last month, Congress could assert itself again: The House last week overwhelmingly voted to block Trump from leaving NATO (by defunding a withdrawal), and The New York Times' editorial board is calling on the Senate to do the same—while noting there's no sign Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has the appetite for that confrontation with Trump.
Meanwhile, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said this weekend that Trump remains committed to NATO but just wants countries to spend more. Of course, it's easier to believe Trump himself than any of his interpreters, in the US or elsewhere. | | Russia's Biggest Threat to Europe? Europe Itself | | Western anxiety over Russian aggression has evolved since the invasion of Ukraine—from concerns about "little green men" to election interference that reached the US.
A new RAND report finds the threat landscape roughly unchanged, with Eastern countries more vulnerable to Russian "hostile measures" and core EU and NATO powers more resilient. While the policy prescription is for further economic and institutional development on Russia's periphery, the study makes another point: If Europe is wary of Russia, it should also look inward, as crises like Brexit and disputes over migration may pose the biggest threats to Europe's stability. Russia has exploited divisions by "cultivat[ing] relationships with extremist parties" across Europe's far right, but they're rising "quite apart from Russian actions." | | | | | | |
