| | | | Fareed: Boris Johnson and the Decline of Europe | | Boris Johnson's "rise to 10 Downing Street is bad for Britain, for Europe and for the United States," Fareed argues in his latest Washington Post column. With Johnson's promised Brexit, Europe will lose a powerful member of its community, and the US will lose a like-minded advocate in Europe's policy debates.
Europe could help face down today's challenges from Russia and China and uphold the liberal order, Fareed writes, but unfortunately "it is moving in the opposite direction. We are watching the shriveling of a group of nations that have defined and dominated the international stage since the 17th century. Brexit will only accelerate this sad slide." | | International Shipping Is Being Destabilized | | Count secure shipping among the international norms that have eroded in recent years. After Britain's seizure of an Iranian vessel, Iran's accosting of a British-flagged ship, Russia and Ukraine's reciprocal maritime interceptions, and the US seizure of a North Korean cargo ship, Leonid Bershidsky concludes at Bloomberg that in "today's multi-polar world, countries can grab other nations' vessels and get away with it."
"Without adequate protection," he writes, commercial "ships can easily turn into geopolitical chips" in larger confrontations. Though Bershidsky points to a broader trend, Iran and the UK are caught up in it most immediately, and different analysts have taken different views on their tit-for-tat exchange: At the Carnegie Endowment, Judy Dempsey surmises it has revealed Britain's (and Europe's) weakened standing, while Aveek Sen warns at LobeLog that if Iran's actions provoke a larger European response, it could spell the ultimate end of the 2015 nuclear deal that Europe has backed. | | | In a Project Syndicate op-ed, Stephen S. Roach attributes to China a strategy that (until recently) some analysts had seen from Iran: waiting out President Donald Trump, on the assumption US policy might change after 2020. Traditionally, China has been "patient and methodical in dealing with external wildcards—especially US politics," Roach writes.
China won't "bet" its trade-war strategy on the 2020 election, Roach writes, but Chinese officials "don't share the US consensus view that America's post-2020 China policy trajectory will stay its current course—Donald Trump or not." Of course, things can still escalate in the meantime: Writing at the Nikkei Asian Review, Frasier Howie and Roger Garside predict the next round of the trade war will be fought on Wall Street, as the US could apply greater scrutiny to Chinese companies traded in the US. In a worst-case scenario, a US "blacklist[ing]" of Chinese firms on Wall Street would mean "billions of dollars of stocks would have to be dumped." | | The Origins of Latin-American Migration | | As President Trump rails against immigration from Central America—and as the plight of asylum seekers continues to dominate headlines—World Politics Review Editor in Chief Judah Grunstein looks at the economic and political collapse that, he argues, is driving it.
Two competing governance models—Western-style, liberal capitalism and Hugo Chavez-style socialism—have each failed Latin America, he writes. The former exposed citizens to global market forces, while the latter failed to manage economies via state control. That's left "the most vulnerable Central Americans and Venezuelans with few options other than to flee," Grunstein writes. Criminal gangs have thrived, Grunstein writes, and the status quo leaves the door open to hard-right and hard-left demagogues alike. | | Korea's Diplomatic Triangle | | In a concise summary of diplomacy on the Korean peninsula, Stein Tønnesson sizes up the three players—South Korean President Moon Jae-in, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and America's Donald Trump—in the latest issue of Global Asia. Tønnesson depicts Moon as the "architect" of the current rapprochement, Kim as an "audacious player" committed both to his own strategies and to preserving his family's dynasty, and Trump as a flexible deal-maker out to prove himself adroit and pull US forces back from the region.
Trump's lack of ideology makes him more likely to compromise than other US politicians of either party, Tønnesson writes; "[f]rom the perspective of Moon and Kim, Trump's ability to defy advice from his administration and take decisions on the basis of his own gut feelings is therefore a clear asset." | | | | | | |
