| | | | The world has less confidence in President Trump than Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron—and also Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, according to a new survey of 25 nations.
"Large majorities say the US doesn't take into account the interests of countries like theirs when making foreign policy decisions," the Pew Research Center finds in its latest survey of global attitudes. "Many believe the US is doing less to help solve major global challenges than it used to. And there are signs that American soft power is waning as well, including the fact that, while the US maintains its reputation for respecting individual liberty, fewer believe this than a decade ago."
According to the survey, a median of 27% have confidence in President Trump to "do the right thing" in international affairs, compared with 30% who trust Putin to do so and 52% who think the same about Merkel.
Still, respondents haven't lost faith in a US-led world order. "When asked which would be better for the world, having China or the US as the top global power, people in nearly every country tend to select the US," particularly Chinese neighbors including "Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Australia."
| | The Lesson of Trump's New Deal? Relax. | | | The new trade deal to replace NAFTA was a political win for President Trump and his allies. It should also reassure some of his critics, too, writes Walter Russell Mead in The Wall Street Journal.
"In addition to showing that Mr. Trump's wild tactics can sometimes produce real results, the USMCA should defuse some fears about the supposed radicalism of his agenda. The new trade regime with Canada and Mexico is, like the old one, imperfect, but it is hardly a lurch toward autarky. Trade in North America will remain considerably more open than it was before NAFTA went into force," Mead writes.
"If the USMCA is a reasonable model of the kinds of changes Mr. Trump wants to make in the world trading system, his goals at the World Trade Organization and elsewhere could be less disruptive—and more achievable—than many fear. He has reset the terms of political debate while leaving the North American trade relationship largely intact." | | Why the Populists Can't Play Nicely Together | | | Steve Bannon has taken his populism playbook to Europe. But there's a problem, suggests Tony Barber for The Financial Times: the continent's populists aren't all on the same page. Indeed, Bannon might find that in Europe, nationalism trumps populism.
On foreign policy, for example, "Austria's Freedom party and Italy's League are at odds with Poland's ruling Law and Justice party over their refusal to criticize Moscow's armed intervention in Ukraine," Barber notes.
Meanwhile, "Marine Le Pen's National Rally…draws on quintessentially Gallic traditions of statism and protectionism. Across the Rhine, however, Alternative for Germany is a self-professed advocate of free-market economics…"
"To be sure, the rightwing radicals have some cards to play. Their message on immigration, national identity and Islam's place in Europe is strident and simple."
"But the nationalism that brought them success in domestic politics will be, in the end, the same nationalism that limits their effectiveness on the European stage." | | Another Casualty of Team Trump's Iran Policy | | | President Trump's approach to North Korea and Iran hasn't just upended traditional diplomacy, argues Jeffrey Lewis for Foreign Affairs. It is undermining efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, too. "Trump has signaled that Washington's concern about Iran's nuclear program is really just an excuse that justifies a thinly veiled preference for regime change," Lewis writes. "Trump's approach feeds the narrative that US talking points about the spread of nuclear weapons are little more than convenient fictions that exist to enable other foreign policy priorities. "What we do not know is this: At what point will the decline of US credibility pose a mortal threat to the legitimacy of the nonproliferation regime? Legitimacy is hard to measure, whether it is the legitimacy of an international regime or a autocracy. If it is fading away, we may not know until it is too late." | | Why the Indonesia Tsunami Was So Deadly | | | The death toll following the tsunami in Indonesia jumped to 1,234 on Tuesday, CNN reports. One reason it proved so deadly? "Unlike the 2004 tsunami that devastated south Asia, this wave was not prompted by an earthquake hundreds of miles out to sea. Instead it was a localized tsunami resulting from an earthquake close to the coast," writes Hannah Ellis-Petersen in The Guardian. "The focus on the technological points of failure here is misguided because this was a localized tsunami. In that case you can't rely on a warning system; people should seek high ground immediately. They cannot afford to wait for a siren or a warning, they need to move instantly. The problem is, from what I've seen from the footage, many people appear not to have done that," Ellis-Petersen quoted Phil Cummins, a professor of natural hazards, as saying. | | Could it Happen in America? Yes. | | | Indonesia's experience has troubling implications for America's Pacific coast, suggests Robinson Meyer for The Atlantic. If an earthquake hit the Cascadia subduction zone near the US coastline and triggered a tsunami, "its point of origin would likely sit between the coastline and [an] array of tsunami sensors. So, any wave would have to travel out to sea before it could be detected by a US government sensor," Meyer notes. "The daunting lesson from this scenario is that education and preparation will save far more lives than a sophisticated tsunami warning system. That's why everybody needs to know one big lesson about tsunamis, [geophysicist Mika] McKinnon told me: 'If you're at a coast, and you feel severe shaking, you run for high ground as fast as you can.'" | | | | | | |
