| | | | President Trump was keen to point out that North Korea's military parade at the weekend took place minus the long-range missiles that have been previously featured. But just because Kim Jong Un isn't showing off some of his weapons, doesn't mean they aren't there, writes Jeffrey Lewis for The National Interest.
"Perhaps President Trump will simply declare the problem solved, as he did shortly after the Singapore Summit. Perhaps we can trust North Korea to avoid drawing attention to the new nuclear-armed missiles that it is now mass producing. And perhaps we can count on other world leaders to play along. But I have my doubts about whether this state of affairs is truly sustainable. What happens when Moon Jae-in is no longer president of South Korea? Or when Trump is no longer president of the United States? Or, heck, what happens if Trump just changes his mind? Then things could get very tense.
"And when they do, those nuclear-armed ICBMs will still be around. We did not see any in Kim Il-sung Square on Sunday, but that simply means they were elsewhere…"
| | The Real Story of Sweden's Election | | | The far-right Sweden Democrats didn't quite make the gains pollsters predicted in Sunday's election. But the result still underscores an oft-overlooked story in Europe, writes Jon Henley in The Guardian.
"The real story of Sweden's election is not, as the prevailing narrative has it, the irresistible onward march of Europe's far right but the continuing decline of the major parties of government, the fragmentation of national votes and the rise of a number of smaller parties," Henley writes.
"In a trend visible across Europe, the electoral base of the leading mainstream parties is shrinking…Across the continent, mainstream parties and alliances that once dominated national politics are in retreat, most notably on the left, making coalition-forming harder – even in countries, like Sweden, long used to coalition government – and producing weaker, potentially shorter-lived governments." | | Why the China Spat Is Going to Get Ugly | | | China on Monday warned the Trump administration it will take countermeasures if America escalates the ongoing trade fight. Gideon Rachman suggests in the Financial Times that anyone who confidently assumes this isn't going to end up in an all-out trade war isn't paying attention.
"For political reasons, both Mr Trump and President Xi Jinping of China will find it very hard to back away from this fight. It is possible that Mr Trump would accept a symbolic victory. But Mr Xi cannot afford a symbolic defeat. The Chinese people have been taught that their 'century of humiliation' began when Britain forced the Qing dynasty to make concessions on trade in the 19th century. Mr Xi has promised a 'great resurgence of the Chinese people' that will ensure that such humiliations never occur again," Rachman writes.
"There is also reason for doubt that, when it comes to China, the Trump administration would settle for minor concessions — such as Chinese promises to buy more American goods or to change rules on joint ventures. The protectionists at the heart of the administration…have long regarded China as the core of America's trade problems." | | The 9/11 Lesson We Still Need to Learn | | Tuesday marks the anniversary of the September 11 attacks. If the United States is going to continue its relative success in protecting the homeland, it needs to ensure that it prepares for the threat posed today, not that of that devastating day 17 years ago, suggest Peter Bergen and David Sterman for CNN Opinion.
"Nineteen foreign hijackers who entered the United States on non-immigrant visas, carried out the 9/11 attacks. That image of the threat has colored threat perceptions since. Yet since 9/11 just under half of 449 jihadist extremists charged in the US were born citizens and 84% are citizens or legal permanent residents. About three in 10 are converts to Islam," Bergen writes.
"The travel ban would not have prevented a single deadly attack since 9/11 nor would it have prevented the 9/11 attacks.
"What the United States should do is take the respite provided by ISIS's territorial collapse in Syria and Iraq to reassess and answer fundamental questions regarding its counterterrorism approach."
| | China's Troubling "Transformation" | | "The Chinese government says it is winning a war against Islamic extremism and separatism," writes Chris Buckley for The New York Times. The price? "[T]he country's most sweeping internment program since the Mao era."
"China has sought for decades to restrict the practice of Islam and maintain an iron grip in Xinjiang, a region almost as big as Alaska where more than half the population of 24 million belongs to Muslim ethnic minority groups. Most are Uighurs, whose religion, language and culture, along with a history of independence movements and resistance to Chinese rule, have long unnerved Beijing," Buckley writes.
"The government's own documents describe a vast network of camps — usually called 'transformation through education' centers — that has expanded without public debate, specific legislative authority or any system of appeal for those detained."
| | The Putin Playbook Team Trump Should Borrow From | | Russia appears to have the upper hand in shaping Syria's future. But the Trump administration can still take a leaf out of Vladimir Putin's playbook if it wants to protect US interests in the Middle East, suggests Dennis Ross in the Wall Street Journal.
"If the US wants to prevent Iran from consolidating a land corridor through Syria to Lebanon and the Mediterranean, it has to work through the Russians. If the US wants to blunt the Israel-Iran collision course…it needs Russian cooperation. But Vladimir Putin does nothing free. The question is whether the Trump administration is willing to apply the requisite leverage," Ross writes.
"The Trump administration could condition an American withdrawal on the following limits for Iranian and allied militia activity: No military bases in Syria; no more surface-to-surface missiles; no fabrication of missiles or advanced guidance systems in Syria or Lebanon; no qualitatively new air defense radars or missiles; and buffer zones with no Iranian or proxy presence near Turkey, Israel or Jordan." | | | | | | |
