| | | | To Fight Extremism, Think 2011, Not 2001 | | As the United States marks the anniversary of the September 11 attacks, it's important to remember that the threat has evolved over the past 17 years, suggests Hassan Hassan in The Atlantic. Indeed, if the United States wants to counter the extremist threat more effectively, it should look less to 2001, and more to 2011 – and the lessons of the Arab Spring.
"When it launched the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda and its ideology were disconnected from the day-to-day realities of the broader Middle East," Hassan writes.
"After 2011, that changed. Jihadis became grounded in local reality…In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, experts on jihadism studied theorists such as Abdullah Azzam, Abu Musab al-Suri, and Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi. That sort of scholarship remains a useful means of probing belief systems or exploring the origins of modern jihadism. But it is no longer adequate to understand what jihadis stand for or what their guiding principles are, much less what drives the groups in which they operate. Policy makers and observers will now find deep knowledge of the geography; demography; and the political, economic, and social circumstances that might fuel and sustain a conflict more useful than knowing whether a person is more influenced by Maqdisi than Azzam."
| | The Good Thing About Trump's Bad Idea | | | News that "US officials met secretly with Venezuelan military officers who were plotting a coup against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro" is better than it might first appear, suggests Francisco Toro for The Washington Post. Why? Because it underscores that career officials in the Trump administration are willing to push back against "an aggressive commander in chief."
"Trump's instinct is clearly to strike out against Maduro. But the national security establishment, both in the State Department and in the Pentagon, is uniformly opposed to this terrible idea. These officials oppose it because it would undo three decades of diplomacy rebuilding the United States' credibility as a hemispheric partner following a century of Monroe Doctrine interventionism, and would destroy dozens of carefully built relationships with governments up and down the region, all of which are adamantly opposed to military action in Venezuela." | | | The Trump administration's decision to close the Palestine Liberation Organization's mission in Washington is a "hammer blow to any hopes that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians can be revived," Hussein Ibish argues for Bloomberg.
The decision is "the latest in a series of aggressive moves designed to foreclose all Palestinian options other than whatever might be in a forthcoming 'peace proposal' to be presented by Donald Trump's son-in-law and senior adviser on Middle East affairs, Jared Kushner," Ibish writes.
"All this supposed pressure, though, is taking place in a diplomatic vacuum. When demanding Palestinians return to talks with Israel, the obvious retort is, 'What talks?' It's not just that the Trump administration has systematically dismantled the existing framework for negotiations; it hasn't put anything else in its place." | | America Finds Itself Another Quagmire | | The US had its own national security reasons for supporting the Saudi intervention in Yemen, writes Mohammed Ayoob for The National Interest. But as the humanitarian crisis continues, America risks being sucked into a quagmire – and getting more than it bargained for.
"The United States has become embroiled in the conflict for two major reasons. First, Yemen has become the last refuge of the AQAP, the most active arm of al Qaeda, which the United States has been targeting for years. Second, American support for its ally Saudi Arabia is fueled by Washington's antagonism toward Iran," Ayoob writes.
Yet, "American policy has not achieved its objective of ejecting AQAP from Yemen. In fact, by supporting Saudi Arabia's campaign to destroy the rudimentary infrastructure of the Yemeni state and thus degrade the residual capacity of the state to control territory it has provided AQAP the opportunity to expand its presence in Yemen just as [an] American policy of decimating Iraqi state structures helped first al Qaeda and then ISIS expand their tentacles in that country. Failed states provide the best breeding ground for terrorists."
| | Putin's Next Big Adventure? | | Talk of outside powers expanding their footprint in Africa typically focuses on China. But Moscow is increasingly looking for a piece of the action, writes Peter Beaumont for The Guardian.
"Russia is engaged in a frantic new scramble for influence in Africa, which is being spearheaded by a rash of military cooperation and arms deals signed across the continent in 2018," Beaumont says.
"The most recent – an agreement for a planned Russian logistics base in Eritrea, which would give it access to the Red Sea – was announced in early September after nine months that have seen Kremlin officials crisscross from the Horn to the Great Lakes and southern Africa.
"The pace of Russia's renewed intervention has raised fears over the human rights and security implications of selling arms to regimes that are weak or in conflict, particularly as the US has signaled its own plans to withdraw troops and close missions."
| | Why China Will Throw Its Middle Class Under the Bus | | China's growing middle class might be warier about digging in for an extended trade war than their government. But don't expect the Chinese Communist Party to heed their concerns, suggests Zhang Lin in the South China Morning Post.
China's middle class "may not be as patriotic as the government hoped. They generally own property and other assets, so they value private property rights and the market economy…they are those people complaining about Beijing on the Weibo account of the US embassy with regard to China's stock market fall and air pollution," he argues.
"The prospects of this class…are, however, not bright.
"For the Chinese government, which is confident in the country's state-led model, it is not an entirely bad idea to sacrifice middle-class interests in an escalating trade war with the US. Stricter state control over information, wealth and economic activities will help Beijing to manage impacts from the trade war, while a hardline approach can also help to suppress complaints at home." | | | | | | |
