| | | | Downgrading India's Democracy | | After its move to eliminate Kashmir's autonomy, India's premier historian writes that the country's status as a democracy should be "downgrade[d]." Once a miracle of pluralism, in which democracy functioned despite a Hindu majority, sizable Muslim minority, and a vast diversity of languages, Ramachandra Guha writes in a New York Times op-ed that India has slid under Prime Minister Narendra Modi toward "an aggressive Hindu majoritarianism."
After declaring India a "50-50 democracy" 12 years ago—in that it met some democratic benchmarks but fell short on others, like corruption—Guha writes that "[g]iven the lack of any sort of credible opposition to [Modi's] BJP, the atmosphere of fear among religious minorities and the attacks on a free press, we are now a 40-60 democracy, and—if the recent abuse of state power in Kashmir is any indication—well on the way to becoming 30-70."
Writing for The Atlantic, Sadanand Dhume concludes that "if Kashmir is a portent for India's future, we need to start worrying," while Michael De Dora and Aliya Iftikhar of the Committee to Protect Journalists urge the US, in a CNN op-ed, to oppose India's near-total communications blackout in Kashmir. | | Recession Watch Continues | | After the stock market's nosedive and the inversion of bond yields on Wednesday, sirens continue to blare on opinion pages, but The Economist writes that while markets "are braced for a global downturn"—noting plenty of causes for concern—"a recession is so far a fear, not a reality." Jobs and wages are healthy, and banks are lending; the world economy is still growing, although not as fast.
Taking a more pessimistic view, The Wall Street Journal is now feuding with President Trump's most hawkish trade advisor, Peter Navarro, as it blames market troubles on Trump's tariff threats, in an editorial that references a "Navarro recession." The paper's advice for Trump: "The key to avoiding the worst is to restore a sense of policy calm and confidence. Stop the trade threats by tweet." | | Waiting and Watching Hong Kong | | | Observers of Hong Kong have asked the same question for weeks: Will Beijing carry out a military crackdown reminiscent of Tiananmen Square? Writing in Foreign Policy, Jude Blanchette worries about Beijing's calculus: "When backed into a corner, violence is preferable [for Beijing] to perceived political weakness or territorial dissolution," Blanchette suspects, despite the international backlash and "extraordinar[y]" cost it could bring. Writing for the Hong Kong Free Press, David Bandurski sees troubling signs in Chinese state-media criticism of protesters; it shows Beijing "cannot admit any subtlety on complex issues," he argues. | | The Next Climate-Science Project: Attribution | | Climate researchers and government scientists have long displayed strict restraint in refusing to attribute specific weather events to global warming; we know a warmer planet can cause more violent storms and more severe droughts, they've said, but one can't say for certain whether a particular storm, for instance, was caused or made worse by rising temperatures.
That's beginning to change, James Temple writes at the MIT Technology Review, noting that "thanks to better climate models, swelling libraries of earlier analyses, and our improving understanding of these systems, researchers can now often say with virtual certainty that climate change made a particular event more likely or more severe." As researchers run simulations based on massive datasets, they're beginning to model counterfactual storms and droughts, testing how severe they'd be (compared to those that actually unfolded) in a cooler environment. One important question remains, as Temple writes: Will pointing all this out change minds about global warming's urgency? | | Why did Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan turn away from Western allies by purchasing a Russian air-defense system against NATO warnings? Two new essays offer some analysis: In the Financial Times, Laura Pitel, Aime Williams, and Henry Foy write that Erdoğan correctly bet US penalties (mandated by US law, over the Russian weapons purchase) would simply never materialize. Erdoğan rightly predicted President Trump would never implement them, due to Turkey's strategic importance. That said, the rest of Washington is growing resentful, the authors write, and things may change if Trump is voted out in 2020.
In a broader Foreign Affairs profile, Kaya Genc cites a strategic vision of restoring Turkey's Ottoman role as a Muslim-world leader and a key global power player, situated between Europe, Russia, and China. "Erdogan relished these grandiose ambitions" when they were floated by his foreign minister, Genc writes; they fit with his blend of Islamism and strongman-driven reform, and they allowed him to rebalance Turkey away from Europe. | | | | | | |
