| | | | Twilight of the Diplomats | | In a Washington Post column, Marc Thiessen offers a defense of President Trump against impeachment: incompetence. Trump's "handling of Ukraine seemed less the execution of an intelligible plan than a chaotic mishmash of constantly changing urges and demands," Thiessen writes. "According to [US Ambassador to the EU and Trump inaugural donor Gordon] Sondland, 'President Trump changes his mind on what he wants on a daily basis.'"
Thiessen depicts Trump as not knowing what he wants, influenced both by Rudy Giuliani's conspiracy theories and acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney's skepticism of foreign aid. Its validity notwithstanding, Thiessen's argument points to something the Ukraine scandal has laid bare: Trump's ad-hoc diplomacy and disdain for normal channels. In a New York Review of Books essay, former US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul notes the Trump administration's slow pace in filling ambassadorial posts: "Last year, Trump explained his indifference to these vacancies by saying, 'I'm the only one that matters…' He planned to do the entire job of diplomacy around the world himself—with maybe an assist from his son-in-law Jared Kushner."
Trump relies on "small groups of advisers—some inside the government, some outside the government—to develop and execute policy" more than any other modern president, McFaul writes; the Ukraine scandal has revealed the damage of that approach, and diplomats (now impeachment witnesses) ultimately saved the day. Trump's style (and its drawbacks) are part of a larger trend: As Stephen Brown writes for Politico Magazine, diplomacy is changing more broadly. "Global leaders are carrying out foreign policy by Twitter and WhatsApp," Brown writes, and political appointees are ascendant, as bureaucratic hierarchies are pushed aside. | | Rich Countries Need More Immigrants, Not Fewer | | In a Foreign Affairs essay, Charles Kenny writes that the real immigration crisis for rich countries is population decline—and a need for immigrants to supplement it. "The average woman in Europe today has 1.6 children, and the average woman in North America has fewer than 1.9—well below the number needed to keep populations stable," Kenny writes. "Ten European countries, along with Japan, are forecast to see their populations fall by 15 percent or more by 2050."
That means GDP decline, older populations, and more social spending needed to support them. Automation is unlikely to solve the problem (automated tasks seem to generate more demand for human workers, not less, Kenny writes), and governments haven't been able to spur birth rates. Which leaves immigration—and policies to court it—as the best solution. | | Macron: Europe's Provocateur | | | French President Emmanuel Macron made headlines (and drew disagreements) by suggesting NATO might be "brain dea[d]," but Tara Varma writes for the European Council on Foreign Relations that "[t]his is the Macron method." The French president has seen a collapse of his early hopes for consensus on broad, European reform—and a move toward a more robust and independent Europe—with support lacking from Germany, in particular. So he's simply pressed ahead by stirring the pot, "imposing his tempo and proposing new initiatives almost every week." If nothing else, Varma writes, Macron has succeeded in generating discussion and guiding Europe's debates. | | Is Hong Kong About to Get More Violent? | | | In an op-ed for Project Syndicate, Minxin Pei writes of worrisome signals Beijing is sending to Hong Kong. In a communiqué coming out of a recent plenum, the Communist Party of China pledged to "'control and rule' (guanzhi) Hong Kong (and Macau) using 'all the powers vested in [it] under the constitution and the Basic Law,' the mini-constitution that defines Hong Kong's status," Pei writes. In Pei's view, that's a strong indication China will beef up Hong Kong's security services and won't respect the "one country, two system" status quo—a path sure to provoke "even larger demonstrations, marked by even more violence," not to mention international sanctions on China, in the end. | | Does Space Need Rules of Engagement? | | A new space race is on, Michael Peel, Christian Shepherd, and Aime Williams write in the Financial Times: As satellites grow increasingly important for technologies like GPS, more countries are launching them (Norway is the latest entrant, seeking dominance in the skies above the Arctic), while Russia and China are beefing up their own space programs. The next war could involve attacks on satellites, and new anti-satellite missiles and lasers are being developed. Add in the fact that military and civilian technologies blend in space (satellites used to clean up debris can also snatch other satellites, for instance), and one is left with a crowded picture of space where misunderstandings and escalations could arise.
Concerningly, few international agreements govern how space is treated. One expert, Wang Yiwei of Renmin University, recommends to the authors "some sort of code of conduct, like in the South China Sea"—a plan to avoid accidents that could lead to war. Otherwise, like ships in disputed water, satellites could lead to conflict on earth. | | | | | | |
