| | | | How Important Was Baghdadi? | | What will the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi mean for the future of ISIS—and for terrorism, writ large?
Commentators have reacted differently. In The New York Times, Hassan Hassan proposes Baghdadi's death could be more important than that of Osama bin Laden, who had become less involved in day-to-day operations by 2011, while Baghdadi not only oversaw ISIS's rise but prevented internal divisions. The Atlantic's Graeme Wood, meanwhile, writes that Baghdadi "possessed a dramatic vision" but had lost his validity as a caliph along with ISIS's territory; some "members have grumbled that he has been an absentee caliph, gone for months at a time, and not even clear in his instructions about whom to follow in his absence," Wood writes.
But the group is set to change, others agree. After bin Laden's death, al Qaeda grew less centralized and focused more on local issues; Clint Watts of the Foreign Policy Research Institute suggests ISIS could follow a similar path. "Much like the Islamic State's emergence from al Qaeda, the death of enigmatic leaders often releases distant middle managers to pursue their own violent campaigns and spearhead emerging groups," he writes. "Right now, we should all be asking: what does the Islamic State look like, if it's no longer a state (caliphate) and doesn't have a leader (caliph)?" | | Millennials Want the End of Politics as We Know It | | | As Fareed recently wrote, popular protests—which have arisen in Chile, Hong Kong, Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere—share an underlying economic anxiety, amid a global downturn. At The Guardian, Jack Shenker links these movements to an even longer string of economic woes, writing in an op-ed that today's protesters "are the children of the financial crisis—a generation that has come of age during the strange and febrile years after the collapse of a broken economic and political orthodoxy, and before its replacement has emerged." Shenker quotes Cambridge political scientist Helen Thompson, who wrote that the "post-2008 world is, in some fundamental sense, a world waiting for its reckoning." In Shenker's view, that reckoning is happening now. | | In Lebanon, the Old Order Cracks | | Protesters have won a victory in Lebanon, where Prime Minister Saad Hariri announced his resignation. At The National, Michael Young of the Carnegie Middle East Center writes that even if protesters get their way, and a new technocratic government takes power to clean up mismanagement, elites (especially members of Parliament) will still need to agree to any reforms, and overhauling the country's entire political system won't be so easy. Donor countries can exert influence, he writes, suggesting that "it may be useful to place the economy under a sort of international trusteeship."
Even if change doesn't come easily, Rayan El-Amine writes for Middle East Eye, "a new political culture has been born through this revolt"—one in which protesters, joined across sectarian lines, have realized their power. | | Why China's Slowdown Will Be a Problem for Everyone | | China's rise has drawn concern in the US, but Michael Beckley writes in Foreign Affairs that its slowing economy will present its own problems. That's because rising powers, when faced with economic downturns, become "more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad," he writes. China's economy was growing at 19.3% in 1970, but that's slowed to a projected 6.1% in 2019 (a total some think is inflated). Ghost cities, a government-estimated $6 trillion blown on "ineffective investment" from 2009-2014, and a quadrupling of debt over 10 years reveal economic growth built on sand, Beckley suggests.
Concerningly, when rising powers struggle, they repress dissent, turn protectionist on trade, and open new markets by force. That's what the US did after growth dropped in the late 1800s, "violently suppressing labor strikes at home while pumping investment and exports into Latin America and East Asia," Beckley writes. "Russia, too, had a late-nineteenth-century slowdown. The tsar responded by consolidating his authority, building the Trans-Siberian Railway, and occupying parts of Korea and Manchuria." Beckley predicts a newly ambitious China will respond to economic troubles by resorting "to mercantilist expansion, using money and muscle to carve out exclusive economic zones abroad and divert popular anger toward foreign enemies." | | Will Hong Kong Become a Police State? | | Writing for Foreign Policy, Melinda Liu suggests Hong Kong could face one of two dystopian futures, becoming either a police state or a mob state, as security has spiraled out of control. Police have sought to maintain order, but they've also lost legitimacy (thanks, in part, to suspicions of a tacit alliance with triad gangs). Efforts to deescalate have been in vain, and Liu warns that given police and bureaucratic ties to mainland China, Hong Kong could wind up resembling a "Beijing-style heavy-handed police regime" if things continue apace.
RAND's Derek Grossman, meanwhile, takes a more optimistic view on Hong Kong, suggesting compromises. Protesters are unlikely to be granted all of their demands—they should give up demands for universal suffrage, Grossman recommends—but an independent inquiry into police conduct and the release of protesters from jail should both be doable. | | | | | | |
