| | | | Europe's Populists Are Contradictory and Divided | | | Europe's far-right populists are poised for significant gains in this week's European elections (they'll pick up a third of the European Parliament's seats, a common prediction holds), but they're also failing to offer any kind of coherent agenda, The Economist writes. At a rally in Milan over the weekend, contradictions were on display as speakers pushed a "Europe of nations" vision: a hazily conceived notion of a united Europe in which each nation fends for its own interests—in other words, "snake oil" that will work on the campaign trail but not in Brussels. Populists have usually failed to cooperate in the European Parliament, writes Rosa Balfour of the German Marshall Fund. Split across national lines, they've exhibited "low levels of cohesion" and have succeeded mostly in hijacking debate, Balfour writes. As long as mainstream parties don't allow populists to frame discussions, the surging populist movement won't pose much of a challenge, she writes—despite what those populists are telling voters. | | What a Gay Dating App Reveals About Data, Privacy, and US-China Conflict | | | The case of Grindr, the popular gay dating and hookup app, shows "how two of the biggest stories of our moment are colliding: the rise of the data economy, which sacrifices privacy to profits, and the escalation of US-China tensions," Julian Gewirtz and Moira Weigel write in The Guardian. After Grindr was acquired by a Chinese company, the US government board that investigates foreign investments for national-security concerns (known as CFIUS) pressured the Chinese buyer to sell. The concern: all the incredibly personal and sensitive information Grindr may be collecting on US government employees and service members—and the potential for China's government to seize it. The case illustrates the extent to which lines are being blurred between consumer data, personal privacy, national security, and cross-border use of technology—and how unexpected decisions will need to be made in this new context. | | Their Milkshakes Bring All the Populists to the Yard | | | After UK protesters have taken to tossing milkshakes at prominent far-right politicians, "milkshaking" is now officially a thing. UKIP European Parliament candidate Carl Benjamin has had at least three thrown at him, notes Anoosh Chakelian at the New Statesman, who declares the trend "lactose against intolerance" (she also notes an irony: the alt-right, Chakelian writes, has used milk as a "symbol for white supremacy," and the anti-far-right milkshakers are subverting it). In a "Milkshake Party manifesto" op-ed, published in Politico Europe, writer Andrew Scott says the point is absurdity, to match that of Britain's political times. A massive food fight between all parties, he writes, would "raise the level of political discourse." Nigel Farage, Scott notes, took a sour and scolding tone after getting milkshaked (or milkshaken, or perhaps even milkshook), choicely decrying the left's so-called radicalization after once promising to take up arms for Brexit. The tactic works, writes Matt Ford of The New Republic, because it does to Farage and his ilk what they so enjoy doing to their own opponents: It gives them a dose of public humiliation. | | All the President's Threats | | | It's been said before that President Trump drew a "red line" in Venezuela, only to see Russia test it. Writing at Bloomberg, Hal Brands makes a broader point about Trump's threat-based foreign policy: In the cases of Venezuela, North Korea, and Iran, Trump has been presented with real problems, sought to address them with aggressive, unilateral threats that have (in the case of Iran, at least) isolated the US—and then failed to back them up. After the initial threats, each case is a story of miscalculation and poor planning by the president and his advisors, and Brands warns that the Trump administration can't keep ignoring the detailed work that's critical to successful diplomacy. | | America, Iran, and the Great-Power Game | | | War with Iran would embroil the US in something it's not quite prepared for, The Washington Post's Max Boot has argued, but beyond potentially entrapping a rival in another Middle East quagmire, what do US-Iran tensions mean for the world's other major powers, China and Russia? Both are watching and waiting, writes Paddy Ryan at The Spectator. For now, Russia appears content to reap economic benefits from America's embargo on Iranian oil (Russia was the world's number-two crude-oil exporter, according to 2016 data from the International Energy Agency; with Iranian oil off the market, it stands to gain in sales), and China has stayed out of it despite the potential to show diplomatic leadership in finding a way to keep the nuclear deal alive. What's clear, Ryan writes, is that America's relationship with European allies has frayed over the recent Iran tensions, and Russia and China are interested to see what comes of that. | | | | | | |
