| | | | Has Trump Lost the Trade War? | | Jordan Weissmann argues he has, pointing to the recent Census Bureau announcement that trade deficits have grown, and to estimates that tariffs have cost the US economy. What's more, Trump promised fantastic new trade deals, and they've yet to materialize: Despite his browbeating of Canada, Mexico, and China, the new NAFTA looks mostly like a "rebranding," and any China deal figures to deliver more in soybean purchases than real Chinese concessions on bigger issues like intellectual-property theft, Weissmann writes.
Trump may not even be trying to win, Grant Newsham suggests at The National Interest: He's had China pinned down numerous times, taking action against Chinese tech companies and imposing tariffs that really did apply pressure, but he's let President Xi up off the mat at each turn.
Of course, not everyone agrees, particularly on the recent news about trade deficits: "Everyone can calm down" about that, The Wall Street Journal writes, chalking those figures up to a growing US economy, pointing out that imports grew faster than exports, and surmising that Trump's "tax reform and deregulation are working." | | World Powers Are on a Collision Course | | The age of great-power peace is over, Hal Brands and Charles Edel write in their new book, The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order, an excerpt of which The National Interest has published. Major world powers have gotten along since the Cold War, but now China, Russia, and Iran are not only growing more aggressive in their own respective neighborhoods, they're cooperating against the US, as Russia and China have on issues from energy to arms sales, and as Russia and Iran have in Syria.
Their aims aren't just regional. Though these three countries are working to upset the regional alliances America has put into place, what they want is to upend the American-led world order, more broadly.
That point has been made before, but Brands and Edel warn today's problems could escalate. The behavior of China, Russia, and Iran is a "warning light flashing on the dashboard" that presages "still-greater traumas to come," they write. | | All is not lost, after the Hanoi summit, John Delury argues at Foreign Affairs, but it may be up to South Korean President Moon Jae-in to save things. He's well positioned to play intermediary, "clear the way" for lower-level talks, and get Washington and Pyongyang refocused on more limited goals, Delury writes, suggesting Moon should invite Kim to Seoul as soon as possible to keep relations warm. "One or both sides … apparently asked for too much" in Hanoi, Delury suggests, meaning an intermediary is crucial to steer both sides back toward workable requests.
Moon's mediating role is "more important than ever," Khang X. Vu writes at RealClearDefense. By continuing its nuclear activities, North Korea seeks to drive a wedge between the US and South Korea, he argues; that means it's critical for Moon to coordinate closely with the US and keep working to preserve the peace. | | How Fast Is China Growing, Really? | | China's economic slowdown could be more pronounced than we've known: According to a new paper published by Brookings, China has been overstating its yearly GDP growth by an average of two percentage points since 2008, even as those figures dropped below 7% in recent years.
The overstatement is deemed partially accidental: China collects economic data from local governments, which have incentives to inflate their claims of economic success, and the authors conclude that the central government's efforts to fit those data haven't been working. By their own calculations using a different methodology, GDP looks smaller.
This isn't all bad, The Economist argues: If correct, the details offer a "substantially different picture of the shape of China's economy," even if that economy is smaller than advertised. It's less dominated by investment, and consumption is playing a bigger role in growth, meaning China's economy is "better balanced and thus, perhaps, more resilient" than otherwise thought—good news for anyone worried about what will happen to the global economy, if China's grinds to a halt. | | The Case for an Anti-Brexit Party | | Single-issue candidates and political parties usually exist on the fringes, but Alexis Papazoglou argues Britain could use a centrist one. The cadre of MPs who broke from the Labour and Conservative parties may as well band together against Brexit, he writes, as it's "core" to their identity as a breakaway group, even if they're reluctant to say so. Brexit was driven by the small, single-issue, anti-European UKIP party in the first place, so it only makes sense that the inverse could arise. Brexit will "happen sooner or later," Papazoglou writes, and a pro-EU party could shape Britain's future relationship with Europe, post Brexit.
Given the precariousness of UK politics, it wouldn't be too surprising. | | | | | | |
