| | | | The Version of Trump NATO Fears Most | | There are three versions of President Trump that could show up to the NATO summit that begins Wednesday in Belgium, The Economist writes: triumphant, tetchy or torpedo. It's the last one that would really keep Europe's leaders awake at night.
"NATO's nightmare is that a frustrated Mr Trump openly questions America's commitment to Article 5, the alliance's mutual-defense clause, under which an attack on one member is viewed as an attack on all," The Economist argues. "He might, for example, tell the allies that they can't count on Article 5 unless they hit the defense-spending target of 2% of GDP. Having thus shaken the foundations of the alliance's collective defense, a few days later the president proceeds to embrace President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, and agrees to cut back on 'expensive' troop deployments in Europe and 'provocative' missile defenses. In other words, the sequence becomes a replay of the G7 falling-out followed by the embrace of Kim Jong Un of North Korea."
| | Britain (Finally) Reaches Its Moment of Truth | | | The resignation of two senior members of British Prime Minister Theresa May's cabinet over her compromise vision of Brexit has brought the country to a moment of truth, Anne Applebaum writes for The Washington Post. That truth? Hard-line Brexiteers don't have any viable alternative. "The only deal they can genuinely offer — the only one that fits their definition of what Brexit means — is the no-deal deal. That means Britain crashes out of all of its trading and customs arrangements with Europe and, without the bureaucracy to cope, has, for some period of time, a great deal of trouble importing and exporting anything to Europe at all. Because this would cause major economic disruption, none of the Brexiteers wants to put his or her name on it," Applebaum writes. "There is a separate set of questions to ask about the prime minister's current plan, an arrangement that would theoretically keep Britain inside some of the E.U. trade agreements (at least those for goods that have to cross borders) and outside them for others. This is precisely the kind of thing Britain should have come up with 18 months ago…" | | No, North Korea Can't Be the Next Vietnam | | | On the surface, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's suggestion that North Korea should follow Vietnam's path to economic modernization is appealing, writes Huong Le Thu for the Financial Times. But there's a crucial difference – Hanoi has largely embraced the international order, while Pyongyang seems determined to shun it. "Vietnam is now a booming economic and political power, with Asia's third-highest gross domestic product growth rate — below China and India — for much of the past decade. But for decades after the Communist victory in 1975, the country was seen as a 'rogue state' and isolated by the West through sanctions and severed diplomatic ties," she writes. "Vietnam's reintegration with the world was a result of it complying with the post-cold war order, not defying it. Although Vietnam's communists remained in charge, the country became a supporter of international law and norms. North Korea's intentions remain unclear, but the prospects of its compliance with the international system of arms control are remote — nuclear weapons remain its strongest bargaining chip." | | Secretary Pompeo, Welcome to the Biggest US Foreign Policy Failure | | Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's visit to Afghanistan on Monday was largely overlooked. That's a shame, suggests Stephen Walt in Foreign Policy, because it's time to talk about the most misguided of US foreign policies.
"Prolonging the war made little sense in 2009 and makes even less sense today, because al Qaeda and other violent extremists have plenty of other safe havens, and a landlocked country in Central Asia isn't an especially attractive place from which to operate a global jihad against the West," Walt writes.
"Today, the Taliban control more territory than at any time since they were ousted from power. The number of civilian casualties peaked in 2017 and remains on a similar pace this year, and the number of insurgent attacks per year has been rising steadily too."
| | Can the Kremlin Control the Monster It Created? | | | From the "Cossacks" that have been used to intimidate domestic dissenters, to private military groups that have operated in Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere, Russia has increasingly turned to semi-state actors to carry out its aggressive policies, writes Kimberly Marten for Lawfare. The problem? It's not always clear how much control the Kremlin actually has. "Sometimes the Kremlin probably is using these forces…to hide its role in controversial or illegal military actions. But we know that on many economic and social issues, Putin has stepped back in recent times. Decisions are often the product of bureaucrats fighting for their own turf while guessing what Putin might want…Russian state security organizations, too, engage in regular infighting without Putin's oversight. It is likely that their semi-state associates are not always following Putin's direct orders, either," Marten writes. "The problem is likely to grow worse with time, as an aging Putin, now in his last constitutionally-mandated term as president, risks becoming a lame duck." | | The Cradle and the Grave of America's Syria Policy | | The reported imminent fall of rebel-held Daraa -- the Syrian city often dubbed the cradle of the rebellion -- to Bashar al-Assad's forces underscores the seeming inevitability of his triumph, suggests Rodger Shanahan for The Interpreter. It's also a reminder of how little interest or influence the United States has left in the country's future.
"Daraa was once part of a southern deescalation zone negotiated between the US, Russia, and Jordan in 2017 and reaffirmed in a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Trump in November," Shanahan writes.
"[T]he more Damascus reestablishes its control and the less interested in intervening Washington appears, except in limited tactical situations, the greater the likelihood that realpolitik will factor into factions' political considerations. The Syrian Kurds will eventually have to make a deal with Damascus, and the Americans will eventually leave." | | | | | | |
